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The theoretical model presented here describes the interactions between a concentrated industrial sector and 
a perfectly competitive financial system where industrial firms can issue bonds or borrow from money from 
the banks in order to finance their investments.  It is shown that an exogenous modification in the degree of 
concentration in the industrial sector does not only affects the equilibrium level of investments and the  
price of the final good, but also  the transmission mechanism of the monetary policy.  This paper also 
presents a first simplified framework to study the interactions between market power of industrial firms on 
the credit market and endogeneity of the composition of their external finance (in this context, bank credit 
and bonds).  For this reason one of the main assumptions of the model is the existence of the  “credit 
channel”.  The endogeneity of the composition of industrial firms’ external finance also allows to formalise 
(although in a very simplified one-period context) a situation of simultaneity between financial and 





* I am very grateful to Giuseppe Marotta for his helpful comments and suggestions. All mistakes are 
mine.   2 
1. Introduction 
With the advent of the EMU the European economies have witnessed a number of mergers and 
acquisitions not only in financial and local banking markets (for instance, in Italy) but also in relevant 
transnational industries, such as telecommunications and high technology.  A first point that will be made 
here is that these issues should not only be studied within and industrial economic perspective but also for 
the multiplicity of their macroeconomic implications.  
While a very extended literature on the macroeconomic implications of market concentration in 
the industrial sector already exist, hardly any literature exists on the macroeconomic implications of 
market concentration and market power in the banking and financial sectors.  The problem is far from 
being irrelevant since there is no reason to assume that industrial firms’ market power should have 
implications for the goods market equilibrium and not for the banking and financial market equilibria, at 
least to the extent that bank credit and securities are imperfect substitutes as a source of finance for 
industrial firms.  One of the purposes of the present analysis is therefore to provide a first simplified 
theoretical framework to analyse this sort of institutional and structural changes which involve the 
behaviour of the industrial firms  not only in the goods markets, but also in the banking and financial 
sectors.   In particular, the theoretical model introduced here shows how an exogenous modification in the 
degree of concentration in the industrial sector affects: 
a) the equilibrium level of investments and the price of the good produced by the “concentrated” 
industrial sector; 
b) the transmission mechanism of the monetary policy with composite effects that, in spite of their 
complexity, may be decomposed into precise elements with a specific economic interpretation.    
Another purpose of this work is to study how all the above-mentioned phenomena interact with the 
firms’ financial structure (in terms of recourse to bank credit or bonds).   The only promising approach to 
analyse this issue, where imperfect substitution between bank credit and securities play such an important 
role seems to be provided by the “credit view”. One of the main assumptions of the model is therefore the 
existence of the  “credit channel” of monetary shocks transmission
1.   
For these reasons this paper is close, at least in spirit to the “credit view”, even though the 
assumption of a (limited) substitutability between bank credit and securities for the industrial firms allows 
us to identify here a more general framework where the exclusive recourse to bank credit or securities 
constitute two extreme benchmark cases.  The endogeneity in the composition of external finance for 
industrial firms also allows to formalise (although in simple one-period context) a situation of 
                                                            
1 In this regard we employ here a more extended definition of monetary shock than the one commonly used by Bernanke and 
Blinder (1988, 1992) and closer to the one used by Friedman and Kuttner (1993), who consider not only the “monetary policy 
shocks”, but any exogenous and/or unpredictable change that may take place in the monetary sector of the economy.   3 
simultaneity between financial and investment decisions for the firms.    
In times of deep institutional changes, one might also observe that the industrial firms’ market 
power with respect to financial intermediaries constitute one of the relevant features of a financial system, 
although the interactions between institutional configurations of a financial system and short-run 
behaviour of the relevant variables have been paid little attention by the literature, with a few exceptions 
(see, for instance, Schmidt, 1999
2 and Mazzoli, 1998, ch. 1,2,3,4).   In particular, Mazzoli (1998) provides 
a number of theoretical and empirical analyses where institutional configurations of a financial system 
interact with industrial firms’ market power and with the transmission mechanism of monetary policy.  
However this is certainly a field where a precise theoretical configuration is missing, apart from the 
generical background provided by the “creditist” models assuming the “specialness” of bank credit. 
 
2. Does market power matter only in the goods market or also in the credit 
market? 
The macroeconomic implications of credit market structure have been explicitly analysed only “on 
the deposits side” (VanHoose, 1983, 1985), while other partial equilibrium analyses, mainly based on an 
industrial organisation approach (like the oligopolistic version of Monti-Klein model, presented, for 
instance, in Freixas e Rochet, 1997) only focus on the credit supply side and do not raise the problem of 
the possible macroeconomic implications of changes in the market structure.  Other industrial 
organisation contributions focusing on the interaction between banks and industrial firms (Brander and  
Lewis 1985, Poitervin, 1989a, 1989b, 1990) have proposed models of duopoly on the goods market where 
the banks’ behaviour has the only consequence of introducing possible strategic advantages of industrial 
firms in installing excess production capacity or, in the case of  Poitervin (1989b), where the existence of 
a unique monopolistic bank generates  pro-collusive effects in the goods markets, since an aggressive 
policy implemented by either of the industrial firms in the goods market would make riskier the bank 
assets and reduce, ad a consequence, their value.   
Nevertheless the implications of these classes of models have been confined to the field of 
industrial organisation and, despite the relevance of their findings, they have not really been employed in 
macroeconomic analysis, nor have their results been incorporated into macroeconomic models, specially 
for what concerns the possible (exogenous) modifications in the credit market structure “on the demand 
side”, an aspect almost entirely neglected by the literature (with the isolated exception of Mazzoli, 1998, 
ch. 4, where the problem is dealt with in a context of partial equilibrium), even though phenomena of 
important mergers and acquisitions in strategic industries (such as, for instance, telecommunications) are 
far form being irrelevant in these last years in Italy, in Europe and in the States.  As we know it, recently   4 
in Italy many mergers have actually taken place in the banking sector, i.e. on the “supply side” rather than 
in the “demand side” of the credit market.  Nevertheless, the data of the Italian Antitrust Authority 
(Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, 1999) show that in the non-financial services and 
manufacturing sectors the overall value of the mergers has been higher than in the banking sector in 1996 
and 1997, while the opposite happens only in 1998  (also due to the acceleration in the processes 
integration in financial and banking sectors, determined by the introduction of EURO)
3.  Another (more 
indirect) piece of evidence showing, for Italy,  the relevance of concentration processes in non-banking 
sectors is given by the constant and significant growth of cases raised by the Italian Antitrust Authority for 
episodes of concentration among independent firms: 292 in 1997, 344 in 1998 and already 104 in the first 
quarter of 1999.  These brief pieces of evidence show that if, on the one hand, the EMU has created strong 
incentives for mergers and acquisitions in the banking sector, a similar process of concentration is taking 
place on the other hand among industrial firms in important industries (such as, for instance, 
telecommunications) 
At the same time another relevant structural phenomenon is taking place in Europe: an increase in 
the degree of substitutability between bank credit and securities as a source of finance for industrial firms, 
due to the expansion of financial markets in the EMU.  And, of course, both phenomena might be 
explained by the incentives and scale economies determined by the EMU.  While the implications of 
increases in the degree of concentration on the “supply side” of the bank credit market can be analyses (at 
least in terms of partial equilibrium) within framework of the oligopsonistic version of Monti-Klein 
model, there is hardly any literature on the implications of a simultaneous increase of industrial firms’ 
market power on the goods and credit markets: modelling this specific issue is one of the purposes of this 
paper. The model also contains a typical “stylized fact” of the “credit view”: the composition of the 
industrial firms’ external finance depends on the spread between interest rate on bank credit and bonds.  It 
will be shown that the degree of substitutability between bank credit and securities deeply affect the way 
an increase in the degree of concentration in industry affects the transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy.   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                            
2 I am very grateful to Giuseppe Marotta for pointing out this reference to me. 
3 In particular, both the manufacturing and the non-financial services sectors show operations of mergers and concentration 
within the EU for a value higher than 80 billions of dollars in 1997 and for approximately 60 billions of dollars in 1996, and 
only in 1998 has the financial services sector shown operations of merger and concentration for higher values than the other 
two above-mentioned sectors.    5 
3.  A “mesoeconomic” model with oligopoly on the goods market and 
oligopsony on the credit market 
The model introduced here is meant to propose a first theoretical framework to analyse the 
macroeconomic impact of exogenous changes in the degree of concentration (possibly caused by mergers 
and acquisitions) in industries of relevant macroeconomic magnitude.  It describes a closed economy and 
could be defined “mesoeconomic”, since it is constituted by macroeconomic equations and 
“microeconomic” conditions describing in detail a single industry of relevant size, composed by large 
firms enjoying market power both on the goods market and in the bank credit market.  The banks are 
assumed to be much more numerous than the firms and compete among them under a perfectly 
competitive regime. 
The attention is focused on the investments (which are assumed to last for one period only) of the 
industrial firms.  For this reason, it is assumed that the wages and the level of employment are given and 
set at the beginning of the period under consideration, according to an efficiency wages mechanism: this 
could be interpreted as a ceteris paribus assumption, or, alternatively, as an assumption only valid in the 
short run.   
The industrial firms’ (henceforth “firms”) investments determines the quantity and price of the 
final good produced by the industry.  The demand for physical capital affects, on the one hand the credit 
and bonds markets equilibria, on the other hand the output produced by the firms
4. 
 
3.1      General assumptions 
One of the main “ingredients” of the model must be a convenient framework allowing, on the one 
hand to formalise the macroeconomic effects of a change in firms’ market power in the industrial sector, 
and, on the other hand, to include as extreme cases both perfect competition and monopoly.  The simplest 
and more direct way to do the trick is to assume - like in Mazzoli (1998, ch.4) - that there are n identical 
firms (each of them owing some of the given N production units) behaving as oligopsonists à la Cournot  
on the bank credit market. The investment k (lasting for one period only ) may be financed either with 
bank credit (at the interest rate  rL) or by issuing bonds (at the interest rate rB). The firms choose to 
finance a portion µ of investments by borrowing from the banking system and a portion (1-µ) by issuing 
bonds. 
Since we have a constraint given by the equality between industrial investments and supply of 
funds by the financial sector of the economy, the optimal investment decision for the firms amounts to:  
                                                            
4 The aumont of financial capital in this context determines the quantity of final good supplied in the goods market, although it 
does not really determines a «quantity precommitment» effect similar to the one described in Kreps and Scheinkmann (1983)   6 
1) choosing the portion (1-µ) of investments to be financed by issuing bonds on the (competitive) 
bond market and the portion µ to be financed by borrowing on the (oligopsonistic) bank credit market
5; 
2) choosing (for what concerns the portion of capital µ financed by bank credit) an optimal point 
on the bank credit supply function, determining in this way the interest rate rL on bank credit;  this 
obviously also contributes to determine the level of the other interest rate, rB, since, by implicitly defining 
the portion of investments financed on the other market - the bonds market - this affects its competitive 
equilibrium. 
As mentioned before, it is assumed that the number N of production units owned by each of the n 
firms is fixed.  Each of the n firms therefore raises external finance in order to provide with capital k each 
of its N/n production units.  In this way - by keeping the number of production units in the economy 
constant - a change in the degree of concentration can be conceptually isolated form any other “entry and 
exit” effect that might affect the scale of the economy. 
In addition, as mentioned before, it is assumed that the firms are oligopolistic in the goods market 
and produce a final consumption good at the price p. 
The money base is assumed to be only constituted by the reserves held by the banks at the central 
bank: this implies that there is no currency and all payments are made with banks deposit. 
Assuming that the monetary policy is non anticipated, the portion of investments that the firms 
decide to finance by bank credit is defined as follows: 
 
µ = arg min [1, m rL
−λrB
λ].                                                                 (1) 
 
where  0< µ ≤ 1, m>0 is a generic positive parameter.  In the open interval (0,1), µ is a constant 
elasticity function (with elasticity equal to  λ) with respect to rL and  rB.  In case we have m rL
−λrB
λ  > 1 
the elasticity of µ with respect to rL will not be −λ, but will be null
6.  For this reason we will define in a 
                                                                                                                                                                                                            
and in Maggi (1996). 
5 Obviously in this context it is assumed that bonds and bank credit are imperfect substitutes for the firms as a source of 
external finance. This is a typical assumption of the “credit view”, although in our case, by endogenizing the composition of the 
firms’ liabilities, the assumption of imperfect substitutability between bank credit and bonds is weakened.  for a more detailed 
survey and analysis of the “credit view”  see Mazzoli (1998, ch. 1-2). 
6The analytical form of (1) is not particularly restrictive, since it could be interpreted as a case of “unanticipated” monetary 
poicy in the following more general form: 
 
µ = arg min {1, m rL
−λrB
λ[1+E*(∆BM)]
τ},     
 
where  0 < m < 1, 
with   
E*(∆BM)= ∫ E(∆BM)dF[E(∆BM)]=0 
   7 
more general way the elasticity of µ with respect to rL as εµ,L.  This definition allows us to discriminate 
between the case where there is substitutability between the two sources of finance for the firms (εµ,L 
constant and equal to −λ) and the extreme case where the bank credit is so “special” that the elasticity εµ,L 
becomes null, although in the model the difference between the two cases is trigged by particular values 
assumed by the spread (rL-rB)  and not according to prior assumptions on the intrinsic nature of bank 
credit. 
Having endogenized the composition of the firms’ liabilities implies that effect of the firms’ 
market power on the credit market depends on the value assumed by µ, and, of course, on the spread 
between the two interest rates (a crucial element of the credit view,  at least in Bernanke and Blinder, s 
(1988) definition).  This happens because the monetary policy, by having - in general - a different impact 
on the two interest rates rL and rB, may induce the firms to raise more capital on the market which turns 
out to be (in case of restrictive monetary policy) less affected by the monetary shocks or (in case of 
expansionary monetary policy) more affected by the monetary shocks.  
The optimisation problem of the representative firm is the following: 
                                                                  -   +                                 -    + 
max π = (N/n) {py - w*l* - (1 + rL)µ(rL, rB)k  - (1 + rB)[1-µ(rL, rB)] k}                   (2) 
 
s.t.                                                +   -      +           
  µ(rL, rB)[(N/n) k + K’] = S(rL, rB, BM)     (3) 
 
and 
   p = L(pY)
ψ rB
−γY
−β ,    ψ, γ, β > 0, Y=Ny.     (4) 
 
where π are the firm’s profits, y the output produced by each production unit, w* the wages and l* 
the labour employed (both fixed in the short run), k the investment for each production unit, S(⋅)  is the 
bank credit supply function
7 (assumed to be a constant elasticity function with respect to rL, and  rB), BM 
the money base (which - having  assumed in our case that there is no currency - is equal to the private 
banks’ outstanding reserves, figuring - in the central bank balance constraint - as a counterpart for the 
bonds held by the central bank), K’ the investments made by all the other production units owned by all 
                                                                                                                                                                                                            
and E*(∆BM)=0  (i.e. unanticipated monetary policy) ossia politica monetaria non anticipata). E*(∆BM) is the private sector 
expectation concerning the monetary policy intervention (defined as change in the money base) F[E(∆BM)] is the probability 
distribution function of the expectations with respect to E(∆BM), τ is a positive parameter describing the elasticity of the 
expectations with respect to ther monetary intervention E*(∆BM). 
7 Equation (3) may be interpreted as a special case of the funtion  S(rL, rB, BM, E*(∆BM)),  again under the assumption 
E*(∆BM)=0, i.e. unanticipated monetary policy .   8 
the other firms; equation (4) is the inverse demand function (assumed for simplicity to be a constant 
elasticity function with respect to the nominal output pY  and the interest rate rB) for the final consumption 
good produced by the industry under consideration, where ψ, γ, β are three generical positive parameters.  
In particular L is a function (assumed to be homogeneous in pY)  that “capture” the causal link existing 
between the determination of the industry output pY and that part of the households’ disposable income 
spent on the industry final consumption good
8.   
This means that the higher the macroeconomic relevance of the industry under consideration, the 
higher will be the value ∂L(⋅)/∂Y.  In other words, the industry output affect its demand in two opposite 
senses: on the one hand (through the term Y
−β) it reflects the usual negative relation between the price and 
the demanded quantity of the good, on the other hand (through the term L(pY)
ψ) it positively affects the 
demand for the good.  Since this is a partial equilibrium model, and since the industry output only affects 
the households disposable income to the extent that our industry is relevant on a macroeconomic point of 
view, we assume that in (4) the main impact of Y on p be negative. 
Constraint (3) explains that the (symmetrical) firms only finance a portion µ of their investments 
by borrowing from the banking system
9. 
Having assumed that the firms behave as Cournot oligopolists on the goods market and Cournot 
oligopsonists on the credit market, and having assumed that the S.O.C. are satisfied, the F.O.C. are the 
following: 
 
p(∂y/∂k)[1 + 1/ nεDP] = 1 +  µrL + (1-µ) rB  + {µ[rL - εµ,L(rL- rB)]} / { n(εSL-εµ,L)},         (5) 
 
where εDP   is the demand price elasticity of the final good, εSL is the bank credit supply elasticity 
with respect to rL and εµ,L  is the elasticity of µ with respect to rL.  This means that we have three potential 
sources of rigidity in the model, and two of them in the credit market.  In particular, in the credit market, 
                                                            
8 The presence of L(⋅) in the demand function derives from the fact that this is a “one-period” model.  In a hypothetical dynamic 
extention of the model one could introduce a time lag between the moment when the industry output is produced and the 
moment when the households actually spend that part ot their disposable income (generated directly or indirectly by the 
industry output) on the industry final consumption good. 
9 Reminding that (3) may be assumed to be a special case with E*(∆BM)=0 of the more general caso of equilibrium between 
the function S(rL, rB, BM, E*(∆BM)) and  the investments financed with bank credit, even when E*(∆BM)=0, the probability 
attributed by the banking system to the case where E(∆BM)≠0 will not be null. In other words, talking about expectations 
formulated by the banking stytem, we could say that, given that we have a large number of banks, at least one bank will attach a 
non-zero probability to the event E(∆BM)>0 and at least one bank will attach a non-zero probability to the opposit event.  
Introducing an explicit formalization ot uncertainty in the behaviour function of the banking system would not have practical 
consequences for the analytical form of the model, since, by assuming an unanticipated monetary policy we would have 
E*(∆BM)=0).  In this way one would explicitly show that the aggregate banking system is diversifying its portfolio, and 
therefore one would justify the existence of a positive (although very small) credit supply even when the spread between rL and 
rB is negative.  However all that would significantly complicate the formal notation of the model   9 
the presence of rigidity in the credit supply (captured by a low value of εSL) is mitigated by εµ,L, which 
(being  negative and having a negative sign) contributes to increase the value of the denominator in the 
last addend on the right-hand side of (5).  In the extreme case where the firm only finance its investments 
with bonds (i.e. µ tends to zero), the only potential source of rigidity in the economy would be on the 
goods market. In this context, µ determines the extent of the firms’ oligopolistic power on the financial 
sector of the economy and, by increasing or reducing its value according to the possible changes in the 
interest rates spread, it contributes to increase or reduce the degree of rigidity in the financial sector of the 
economy
10.   
We can re-write equation (5) as an implicit function: 
 
 f1(p, k, rL , rB, n) = 0 .                                                                                             (6) 
 
The rest of the model is composed by the following equations 
- Equilibrium on the market for bank credit to the firms: 
                 -   +                +   -      +     
  µ(rL, rB)N k - S(rL, rB, BM ) =  f2(rL, rB, k, BM) =0.                                                (7) 
 
- Equilibrium on the bonds market: 
        +    -                +      -                    +    -                                             -   + 
Bb(rB, rL) + BH(rB , pY ) + Lb-H(rB , rL ) + BM - BT - (1 - µ(rL, rB))N k = f3(p, k, rL , rB,BM)=0.          
(8) 
 
                                                            
10 With m rL
−λrB
λ  > 1, we get µ=1, i.e. the firm is financing its investments only with bank credit, then we have εµ,L= 0, and 
(5) becomes the following: 
p(∂y/∂k)[1 + 1/ nεDP]  =  1 +  rL [1 + 1/(nεSL)] .   
   10 
We assume, for simplicity, that the interest rate on deposits is null and the households are also the 
owners of the banking system
11.  Bb and  BH  represent the demand for bonds by the banks and 
households respectively, BT  the (given) aumont of public debt, Lb-H is an excess demand function of 
households’ liabilities with banks.  Even in this case BH(⋅) is affected by the industry output, through the 
impact that the latter has in the determination of the households’ disposable income, which, in its turn, 
can be invested in bonds
12.  Lb-H is defined according to the following assumptions:  since we admit that 
banks lend money to the households, we assume that the sector of bank credit to the households be 
perfectly competitive and that its interest rate be defined as rH    =  rB+  h,  where  h is a constant
13. 
Introducing this assumption amounts to aggregating the bonds market and the market for bank credit to 
the households (both of them perfectly competitive) and does not have particular consequences for our 
analysis, nor does it causes any loss of generality.  Let us introduce now the equilibrium condition 
between money demand and supply  (9) and the equilibrium condition on the market for the final 
consumption good (10). 
           +   -                          -     - 
D






1-α= 0 =  f4 (p, k, rB ),                                  (10) 
D
H(⋅) is the households’ demand for deposits, q(⋅) the reserves e reserve (i.e. the sum of reserve 
requirements and free reserves) of the banking system, C = [L(⋅)
ψ] 
1/β  is obtained by a simple algebraic 
manipulation  of  (4),  Y = Nak
αl*
1−α is the output produced by all the existing production units (being 
fixed in the short run the quantity of labour  l).  Since the equilibrium conditions on the money and bond 
markets are linearly dependent, we only consider equation  (8). 
 
                                                            
11 According to this consideration, there should be also a contribution of the industry output to the income of the public sector, 
through the interest rate on the state bonds. Since the interest rate on the bonds is endogenous, there shoud be a monetary 
feedback of the interest rates on the households disposable income and on the firms’ profits.  We assume here that this moetary 
feedback is negligible. 
12 In particular, by defining ς(pY) that part of households’ disposable income generated by the industry output, saved and then 
invested in bonds, we may assume, without loss of generality, the following relation: 
BH(. ) =W*+ς(pY) - D
H( rB, (pY)).                                  
Even here there is a causal link between the output produced by the industry the disposable income and its allocation. In 
particular, pY affects BH(.) both negatively (through the transactional motivation in the demand for money) and positively 
(through its influence on the aggregate level of savings).  We assume (consistently with the earlier mentioned assumptions on 
the demand for the final consumption good) that the former effect prevails on the latter. 
13 In order to have the signs indicated in equation (8), on the basis of the definition of wealth (and reminding tha wealth is given 
in the model) W* + ς(pY) = D(.) + BH(. ) - Lb-H( . ), the following conditions are assumed to apply: 
∂rH  /∂rB = 1;  |∂D(.)/∂rB | > |∂Lb-H/∂rB | 
   11 
3.2     A comparative statics analysis of the implications of a change in the degree 
of concentration in the industrial sector 
Let us assume, as usual in financial sector models, that in the excess demand functions for 
financial assets the partial derivatives with respect to the own interest rates are larger (in absolute value) 
than the derivatives with respect to alternative interest rates.  We get the following system, where F is the 
















The element  ∂f1/∂rB in matrix F  has an uncertain sign.  It is positive for high values of µ,  (i.e. for 
values of rB sufficiently higher than rL): in particular, the smaller is µ, the larger must be the difference rB 
- rL  in order the inequality ∂f1/∂rB >0 is satisfied.  Two benchmark cases seem to appear here, i.e. when 
∂f1/∂rB is positive (µ high) and negative (µ low), which will be defined respectively “case A” and  “case 
B”.  To these two we should actually add one more particular case, where the firms entirely finance their 
investments through bank credit and the elasticity of  µ with respect to bank credit is null. 
In order to study the implications of an exogenous change in the industrial sector market structure 
we will focus our attention on the case where the monetary policy does not show any perverse effect, i.e. 
when dk/dBM>0 (an expansionary operation does not cause a reduction in the investments). 
Endogenizing the composition of the firms’ liabilities makes the model rather complex and 
requires some restrictions (shown and discussed in the Appendix).  The intuitive meaning of these 
















































































































































































   12 
of µ as a reaction (for instance) to a monetary negative shock, they will tend to avoid the effects of 
monetary policy by borrowing on the market (and at the interest rate) less reactive to the monetary shock.  
This generates a monetary feedback of opposite sign with respect to the initial monetary policy operation, 
and the restrictions only requires that this particular monetary feedback be smaller (in absolute value) than 
the initial monetary policy operation that generates it.  The restrictions are therefore rather general.  When 
the monetary policy multiplier is positive (i.e. when inequalities (16) to (19), shown and discussed in the 
appendix, are satisfied), we get the following results:  
dk/dn>0;          (12) 
dp/dn<0,      (13) 
i.e. a reduction in the degree of concentration in the industrial sector increases, ceteris paribus, the 
equilibrium level of investments and reduces the price of the goods, while the effect on the interest rates is 
more ambiguous
14, and so is the effect on the monetary policy multiplier dk/dBM.  Formally we have: 
 
d(dk/dBM)/dn =  [(1/det(F)] ⋅ [(dD1/dn) - (d(det(F)/dn) ⋅ dk/dBM] = QD + Q∆ .          (14) 
 
where  QD = [(1/det(F)]⋅ (dD1/dn);   and  Q∆ =  [(1/det(F)] [- (d(det(F)/dn) ⋅ dk/dBM]. 
 
QD  may be interpreted as the impact that changes in the money base have on the modified 
conditions of competition;  the latter “spread” their effects not only through the goods market, but also 
through the financial markets. In other words, QD may be interpreted as the “direct” impact that an 
exogenous increase in n has primarily on the “sensitiveness” of the firm’s first order conditions  with 
respect to the interest rate rL (i.e. on the “curvature” of  f1), and secondarily (through a monetary feedback 
involving the partial derivatives with respect to the interest rates in both the credit market, described by f2, 
and the security market, described by f3), on the goods market.  
The term Q∆ may be interpreted as the effect determined by an exogenous modification in n, “for 
a given value of the multiplier dk/dBM, through all the variables  (k, rL, rB) appearing in the bank credit 
market. 
While det(F) and dk/dBM are positive in the case of monetary policy without perverse effects, the 
terms dD
1/dn and d(det(F))/dn  show ambiguous signs.   However it is possible to make a few points on 
the various effects that contribute to determine (14).  In particular, QD (composed by 4 negative elements 
and 3 positive elements when µ elasticity with respect to the bank loans interest rate is equal to −λ) is 
positive when µ = 1 (investments entirely financed by banks).  This means that QD is  positive in the 
                                                            
14 In particular, drL/dn  is composed by 3 positive terms and 1 negative term, while drB/dn is composed by 2 negative terms   13 
extreme case of “non- substitutability” of bank credit for industrial firms (which might be interpreted as 
an “extreme credit view case” where µ=1 and εµL=0).    
Furthermore, dD
1/dn (and, as a consequence, QD) will be larger (and more likely to be positive) 
the smaller is the demand elasticity εDP  and will be smaller (and more likely to be negative) the smaller is 
the sum “εSL - εµL” (positive since it is composed by two positive addends in absolute value), i.e. the more 
anelastic is the goods market with respect to the bank credit market (having defined the rigidity of the 
latter as the sum of εSL and εµL).   
When µ changes, on the other hand (d(det(F))/dn) is constant while (dk/dBM) (always composed 




4. Concluding remarks 
These last years have witnessed a significant increase in the number and relevance of mergers and 
acquisitions in relevant sectors (such as telecommunications and high technology) of many EMU 
countries. 
The theoretical model introduced here shows how an exogenous modification in the degree of 
concentration in the industrial sector affects: 
a) the equilibrium level of investments and the price of the good produced by the “concentrated” 
industrial sector; 
b) the transmission mechanism of the monetary policy with composite effects that, in spite of their 
complexity, may be decomposed into precise elements with a specific economic interpretation.    
Another purpose of the present analysis was to present a first simplified framework to study the 
interactions between market power of industrial firms on the credit market and endogeneity of their 
financial structure in terms of recourse to bank credit or securities.  For this reason one of the main 
assumptions of the model is the existence of the  “credit channel” of monetary shocks transmission
16.  In 
this regard, this work is close, at least in spirit to the “credit view”, even though the assumption of 
substitutability between bank credit and securities for the industrial firms allows us to identify here a more 
general framework where the exclusive recourse to bank credit or securities constitute two extreme 
benchmark cases.  The endogeneity in the composition of external finance for industrial firms also allows 
                                                                                                                                                                                                            
and 1 positive term. 
15 In particular, when  µ changes, the two terms containing the derivative ∂f1/∂rB change sign in opposite directions . 
16 In this regard we employ here a more extended definition of monetary shock than the one commonly used by Bernanke and 
Blinder (1988, 1992) and closer to the one used by Friedman and Kuttner (1993), who consider not only the “monetary policy 
shocks”, but any exogenous and/or unpredictable change that may take place in the monetary sector of the economy.   14 
to formalise (although in simple one-period context) a situation of simultaneity between financial and 





  In the model it is assumed that monetary policy has no perverse effects, i.e. the monetary policy 
multiplier is positive.  Formally we have: 
 
dk/dBM = [(1/det(F)]⋅{(∂S(⋅)/∂BM)⋅[(∂f1/ ∂p) ⋅ (∂f3/ ∂rL) ⋅ (∂f4/ ∂ rB) + (∂f1/∂rL) ⋅ (∂f3/ ∂rB) ⋅ 
⋅ (∂f4/ ∂p)] +-(∂f1/∂rB) ⋅ (∂f3/ ∂rL) ⋅ (∂f4/ ∂p) - (∂f1/∂rL) ⋅ (∂f3/ ∂p) ⋅ (∂f4/ ∂rB) + 
+ [(∂f1/ ∂p) ⋅ (∂f2/ ∂rL) ⋅ (∂f4/ ∂rB)+ (∂f1/ ∂rL) ⋅ (∂f2/ ∂rB) ⋅ (∂f4/ ∂p) - (∂f1/ ∂ rL) ⋅ (∂f2/ ∂rB) ⋅ 
⋅ (∂f4/ ∂p)]} = [(1/det(F)] ⋅ D1    > 0                                                                                  (15) 
         
where  
 
D1 = {(∂S(⋅)/∂BM)⋅[(∂f1/ ∂p) ⋅ (∂f3/ ∂rL) ⋅ (∂f4/ ∂ rB) + (∂f1/∂rL) ⋅ (∂f3/ ∂rB)⋅ (∂f4/∂p)] + 
-(∂f1/∂rB) ⋅ (∂f3/ ∂rL) ⋅ (∂f4/ ∂p) - (∂f1/∂rL) ⋅ (∂f3/ ∂p) ⋅ (∂f4/ ∂rB) + 
+ [(∂f1/ ∂p) ⋅ (∂f2/ ∂rL) ⋅ (∂f4/ ∂rB)+ (∂f1/ ∂ rL) ⋅ (∂f2/ ∂rB) ⋅ (∂f4/ ∂p) - (∂f1/ ∂ rL) ⋅ (∂f2/ ∂rB) ⋅ 
⋅ (∂f4/∂p)]} 
 
  The conditions that satisfy (15) are rather general in terms of relative magnitude of the elements 
composing det(F) and  D1  . 
  D1  is composed (both in case “A” and in case “B”) by 5 positive elements and one negative 
element only.  In particular we will have D1 > 0 when when the following conditions (16) (for “case A” 
with µ  high)  and (17) (for “case B” with µ low) 
 
{(∂S(⋅)/∂BM)⋅[(∂f1/ ∂p) ⋅ (∂f3/ ∂rL) ⋅ (∂f4/ ∂ rB) + (∂f1/∂rL) ⋅ (∂f3/ ∂rB) ⋅ (∂f4/ ∂p)] + 
-(∂f1/∂rB) ⋅ (∂f3/ ∂rL) ⋅ (∂f4/ ∂p) - (∂f1/∂rL) ⋅ (∂f3/ ∂p) ⋅ (∂f4/ ∂rB) + 
+ [(∂f1/ ∂p) ⋅ (∂f2/ ∂rL) ⋅ (∂f4/ ∂rB)]}  > | (∂S(⋅)/∂BM) (∂f1/ ∂ rL) ⋅ (∂f2/ ∂rB) ⋅ (∂f4/ ∂p) |                   (16) 
 
{(∂S(⋅)/∂BM)⋅[(∂f1/ ∂p) ⋅ (∂f3/ ∂rL) ⋅ (∂f4/ ∂ rB) + (∂f1/∂rL) ⋅ (∂f3/ ∂rB) ⋅ (∂f4/ ∂p)] + 
-(∂f1/∂rL) ⋅ (∂f3/ ∂p) ⋅ (∂f4/ ∂rB) +  [(∂f1/ ∂p) ⋅ (∂f2/ ∂rL) ⋅ (∂f4/ ∂rB)+ (∂f1/ ∂ rL) ⋅ (∂f2/ ∂rB)⋅ ⋅(∂f4/∂p)]} >  | 
(∂S(⋅)/∂BM) (∂f1/∂rB) ⋅ (∂f3/ ∂rL) ⋅ (∂f4/ ∂p) |                     (17) 
 
  (16) is not a very restrictive condition, since one can easily show that (∂f1/ ∂ rL) tends to zero when 
µ is very large and close to one..  Even (17), is not a very restrictive condition,  unless one assumes an 
abnormously large magnitude of (∂f1/∂rB) with respect to (∂f1/∂p) and, more in general, with respect to the 
other partial derivatives that compose the five positive terms on the left-hand side of  (17).   
 
  For the sake of the model discussion, det(F) is composed, when µ is big (in “case A”), by 9 
positive elements and 5 negative elements, and, when µ is low (i.e. in “case B”), by 10 positive elements 
and 4 negative elements.  In particular, det(F) will be positive when the two following conditions are   15 
satisfied (for “case A” and “case B” respectively) 
 
(∂f4/ ∂p)[(∂f1/ ∂k) ⋅ (∂f2/ ∂rL) ⋅ (∂f3/ ∂ rB) + (∂f1/∂rL) ⋅ (∂f2/ ∂rB) ⋅ (∂f3/ ∂k) + 
- (∂f1/∂rL) ⋅ (∂f2/∂k) ⋅ (∂f3 ∂rB )] +(∂f4/ ∂k)[(∂f1/ ∂p) ⋅ (∂f2/ ∂rL) ⋅ (∂f3/ ∂ rB) +  - (∂f1/∂rB) ⋅  
⋅ (∂f2/∂rL)⋅ (∂f3/ ∂p)] + (∂f4/∂rB) [(∂f1/ ∂p) ⋅  (∂f2/ ∂k) ⋅ (∂f3/ ∂rL) + (∂f1/∂k) ⋅ (∂f2/ ∂rL) ⋅ (∂f3/ ∂p) + 
- (∂f1/∂rL)⋅ (∂f2/ ∂k) ⋅ (∂f3/ ∂p) - (∂f1/∂p) ⋅ (∂f2/∂rL) ⋅ (∂f3/ ∂k)] > 
 
> | (∂f4/ ∂k) | ⋅ [|(∂f1/∂p) ⋅ (∂f2/∂rB) ⋅ (∂f3/ ∂rL)| + | (∂f1/∂rL) ⋅ (∂f2/ ∂rB) ⋅ (∂f3/∂p)| + 
|(∂f4/ ∂p)| [ | (∂f1/∂rB) ⋅ (∂f2/ ∂k) ⋅ (∂f3/ ∂rL)| + |(∂f1/∂rB) ⋅ (∂f2/∂rL) ⋅ (∂f3/ ∂k)| + | (∂f1/∂k)⋅  




(∂f4/ ∂p)[(∂f1/ ∂k) ⋅ (∂f2/ ∂rL) ⋅ (∂f3/ ∂ rB) + (∂f1/∂rL) ⋅ (∂f2/ ∂rB) ⋅ (∂f3/ ∂k) + 
+ (∂f1/∂rB) ⋅ (∂f2/ ∂k) ⋅ (∂f3/ ∂rL) - (∂f1/∂rB) ⋅ (∂f2/∂rL) ⋅ (∂f3/ ∂k)+ 
- (∂f1/∂rL) ⋅ (∂f2/∂k) ⋅ (∂f3 ∂rB )] +(∂f4/ ∂k)[(∂f1/ ∂p) ⋅ (∂f2/ ∂rL) ⋅ (∂f3/ ∂ rB)] + (∂f4/∂rB) [(∂f1/ ∂p) ⋅ 
⋅ (∂f2/ ∂k) ⋅ (∂f3/ ∂rL) + (∂f1/∂k) ⋅ (∂f2/ ∂rL) ⋅ (∂f3/ ∂p) - (∂f1/∂rL) ⋅ 
⋅ (∂f2/ ∂k) ⋅ (∂f3/ ∂p) - (∂f1/∂p) ⋅ (∂f2/∂rL) ⋅ (∂f3/ ∂k)] > 
 
> | (∂f4/ ∂k) | ⋅ [|(∂f1/∂p) ⋅ (∂f2/∂rB) ⋅ (∂f3/ ∂rL)| + | (∂f1/∂rL) ⋅ (∂f2/ ∂rB) ⋅ (∂f3/∂p)| +|- (∂f1/∂rB) ⋅ 
⋅ (∂f2/ ∂rL) ⋅  (∂f3/ ∂p) | + |(∂f4/ ∂p)| ⋅ | (∂f1/∂k)⋅ (∂f2/∂rB) ⋅ (∂f3 /∂rL )].     (19) 
 
 
  The case  where det(F)<0 and  D1<0 would correspond to a positive monetary policy multiplier 
dk/dBM, but with abnormal values and magnitudes for the partial derivatives of the implicit functions  that 
constitute the negative terms in det(F) and  D1. This case has not been taken into consideration because it 
would have been associated to the paradoxical situation where the nominal monetary policy multiplier 
does not show any perverse effects, due to the composite effects of two perverse effects. 
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